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Practo and Changing Consumer Expectations for Healthcare Access

2 hours ago
9 min read

Industry & Competitive Context

India’s healthcare access problem has historically been structural: a shortage of organized primary care, fragmented patient records, opaque doctor credentials, and a heavy reliance on word-of-mouth referrals for something as consequential as choosing a physician. Digital health platforms emerged through the 2010s to address this fragmentation from different entry points online pharmacy and diagnostics aggregation (1mg, PharmEasy, Netmeds), hospital-led digital extensions (Apollo 24/7), and doctor-discovery-and-booking platforms, the category Practo pioneered.

By FY25, the scale of consolidation in this space had become visible in public filings. Tata 1mg, now housed within Tata Digital, reported consolidated revenue of Rs 2,392 crore for the year ending March 2025, up 22% from Rs 1,968 crore in FY24, alongside a consolidated loss of Rs 276 crore. Tata Digital’s own standalone FY25 revenue was Rs 546.9 crore against a loss of Rs 827.5 crore, underscoring how capital-intensive the broader digital-health push has remained for even a well-funded conglomerate entrant. Practo, by comparison, is a narrower, platform-and-software business rather than a pharmacy-and-diagnostics logistics operation, and its FY24 revenue from operations of Rs 240 crore sits at a different order of magnitude from Tata 1mg’s. No verified public information is available on relative market share figures across these players, as none of the companies involved has disclosed category-wide share data through audited or independently verified sources.

The regulatory environment shifted meaningfully during this period with the government’s Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission (ABDM), which created a framework for digital health IDs (ABHA), a health facility registry, and a Unified Health Interface (UHI) intended to let patient records move between providers with consent. In May 2023, Practo announced that its practice-management software, Ray, had become ABDM-compliant, enabling doctors using Ray to register on the ABDM health facility registry, issue QR codes for patient self-registration, link records to a patient’s ABHA ID, and access government incentive schemes such as the Digital Health Incentive Scheme. Co-founder Abhinav Lal stated at the time that the company would also pursue UHI compliance. This positioned Practo’s existing B2B software business as a bridge between individual clinics and a national digital health infrastructure layer, rather than purely as a patient-facing discovery app.


Infographic on Practo showing healthcare access shift from wait times to instant, convenient digital care for patients and doctors.

Brand Situation Prior to Campaign

Practo was founded in 2008 in Bangalore by Shashank ND, who became CEO, and Abhinav Lal, who became CTO, both engineering graduates. The company’s first product was Practo Ray, a SaaS practice-management tool for small and single-doctor clinics, handling appointment scheduling, patient records, billing, and analytics. Ray is described by the company as having onboarded its first clinics from 2008 and reaching roughly 10,000 doctors by 2012; as of a 2023 company statement, Ray was in use by more than 50,000 doctors. Once Ray had established a base of digitized clinics, Practo layered a consumer-facing product, Practo Search, on top of it, allowing patients to discover doctors and book appointments a B2B-to-B2C sequencing that the company’s own account of its product evolution describes as foundational to everything that followed.

Institutional capital followed this traction. Practo’s first institutional round was roughly INR 25 crore (about $5 million) from Sequoia Capital in 2011. In February 2015, it raised $30 million from Sequoia Capital and new investor Matrix Partners, earmarked for growth in India, international expansion, and acquisitions. Over 2015–2016, the company raised a reported $115 million across three rounds, which took its valuation up roughly 4.5x to $660 million by October 2016. CB Insights included Practo among its list of “50 Future Unicorns of 2019” in early 2019, though it had not reached unicorn status ($1 billion valuation) by that point.

The years following the 2016 funding peak were turbulent by public reporting. In April 2017, Practo laid off approximately 150 employees about 10% of its workforce which multiple outlets including Business Standard, Scroll.in, and Business Insider India attributed to the company’s annual appraisal cycle. By 2018, the company’s momentum had reportedly slowed and it underwent further downsizing, according to industry reporting at the time. A new funding round was reported in August 2020 at a valuation of roughly $335 million about half the 2016 figure reflecting a markdown relative to Practo’s funding peak.


Strategic Objective

Based on publicly available statements and reported business evolution, Practo’s strategic objective across this period can be read as twofold: first, to convert a one-time pandemic-driven surge in telemedicine adoption into durable, repeat platform usage; and second, to shift the underlying business economics from scale-at-a-loss toward operating efficiency and eventual profitability, without abandoning its dual-sided (patient and provider) model. No verified public information is available on an internally stated, formally published strategic objective or mission statement for a discrete “campaign” in the traditional marketing sense; Practo has not published a named advertising campaign brief, agency partnership, or media plan in the public domain that could be cited here. What is verifiable is the trajectory of its product and financial priorities as reported in company disclosures summarized by business media.


Campaign Architecture & Execution

Rather than a single advertising campaign, Practo’s documented strategy for capturing changing consumer expectations was built around product and infrastructure expansion layered onto its original two-sided base. The company’s own account of its evolution describes a sequence: Practo Ray (2008) for clinic digitization, Practo Search for consumer-facing doctor discovery, a consumer app offering round-the-clock access launched around 2012, and a telemedicine layer chat, audio, and video consultations introduced from 2017 onward. This telemedicine capability, built before the pandemic, positioned the company to respond when lockdown-driven demand for remote care arrived in 2020.

During the COVID-19 lockdown period, Practo published a report titled “How India Accessed Healthcare,” which the company used to characterize the shift in consumer behavior it was observing on its own platform. According to that report, as cited by Business Standard in June 2020, online medical consultations on the platform rose 500% between March and May 2020, approximately 50 million Indians used telemedicine during the lockdown period, and 80% of users were first-time telemedicine users. The same report stated that 67% of e-consultations led to a subsequent in-person doctor visit, more than 50% of e-consultations during the period related to COVID-19 symptoms or concerns, roughly 70% of queries originated from metro areas, and psychiatry teleconsultations rose 200%, with 62% of those consultations sought by people aged 21 to 30. In December 2020, Practo partnered with the Telemedicine Society of India to publish a further report, “Rise of Telemedicine 2020.” These reports functioned as both market research and a public-relations mechanism for positioning Practo as an authority on India’s shift toward remote healthcare consumption, though no verified public information is available on the independent audit or third-party verification methodology behind the underlying figures they are presented here as Practo’s own reported findings, relayed by media coverage.

Following the pandemic-era surge, the company’s reported actions suggest a consolidation phase rather than continued aggressive expansion. In April 2023, Practo laid off 41 employees, predominantly from its engineering function, which several outlets linked to a broader rationalization of cost structure rather than to a specific product shutdown. In the same period, the company pursued the ABDM compliance initiative for Ray described above, which extended its B2B software’s relevance into India’s evolving public digital-health infrastructure rather than relying solely on consumer app growth.


Positioning & Consumer Insight

The verifiable consumer insight embedded in Practo’s own published COVID-19 research is that the pandemic did not merely accelerate existing telemedicine adoption among digitally native users it brought a large cohort of entirely new users (reportedly 80% of lockdown-period telemedicine users) into remote healthcare consumption for the first time, with meaningful demand from non-metro geographies (roughly 30% of queries, per the reported 70% metro figure) and from younger demographics specifically for mental health consultations. This data point a 200% rise in psychiatry teleconsultations concentrated among 21–30-year-olds is one of the more specific and useful pieces of evidence that the pandemic reshaped not just the channel through which Indians sought care, but the categories of care they were willing to seek remotely, including historically stigmatized categories like mental health.

The finding that 67% of e-consultations converted into an in-person visit is a notable piece of consumer-behavior evidence: it suggests that, at least during this period, telemedicine functioned on Practo’s platform largely as a triage and referral layer rather than a full substitute for physical care an important nuance for any strategic reading of “changing consumer expectations,” since it implies expectations shifted toward convenience of first contact and access, rather than a wholesale rejection of in-person medicine.


Media & Channel Strategy

The company’s core distribution channel for its consumer offering remained its own mobile app and website, consistent with other platform-model healthtech companies, but no verified figures on app downloads, monthly active users at a specific point in time, or channel-wise consumer acquisition are available from credible public sources for inclusion here.


Business & Brand Outcomes

Financial outcomes are available through Practo’s consolidated filings, as reported by Entrackr and corroborated by YourStory and DealStreetAsia. In FY22, Practo reported revenue from operations of Rs 211.2 crore against a loss of Rs 236.5 crore, with an EBITDA margin of -106% and ROCE of -116%. In FY23, revenue from operations declined marginally to Rs 204.4 crore (down 3.2% year-on-year), while losses narrowed sharply to Rs 99.4 crore, a 58% reduction; EBITDA margin improved to -39% and ROCE to -37%. Within FY23 revenue, diagnostic and consulting services accounted for roughly 50% of operating revenue, growing 9.7% to Rs 102 crore, with the remainder coming from software subscriptions and maintenance sold to doctors and clinics. Total expenses fell from Rs 452.6 crore in FY22 to Rs 345.8 crore in FY23, even as employee benefit costs rose 37.3% to Rs 170 crore (including Rs 22.5 crore in non-cash ESOP costs), and the expense required to generate each rupee of operating revenue fell from Rs 2.14 to Rs 1.69. As of the FY23 filing, Practo operated 12 subsidiaries across India, the United States, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, and Chile.

In FY24, Practo reported revenue from operations of Rs 240 crore, a 22% year-on-year increase, alongside gross merchandise value (GMV) exceeding Rs 3,500 crore. Operating EBITDA losses narrowed 82% to Rs 17 crore, from Rs 99.4 crore the prior year, while contribution margin rose from -1% in FY22 to 40% in FY24. The company reported its core India business grew at a 68% compound annual growth rate between FY22 and FY24, and stated that its fourth quarter of FY24 was profitable, as were the twelve months ending September 2024 though it did not disclose the specific profit figures for either period in the sources reviewed. The company also stated it had served more than 54 million patients across 642 cities and conducted more than 600 hospital audits in the prior fiscal year, according to its own blog as cited in press coverage.


Strategic Implications

Three implications follow directly from the documented record, without extrapolation beyond it. First, Practo’s history illustrates the risk of building consumer platforms ahead of durable demand: the company’s 2015–2016 funding and valuation peak (reaching $660 million) was followed by a reported slowdown by 2018 and a valuation roughly halved by 2020, before an external shock the pandemic produced the demand surge (a reported 500% rise in consultations) that the company’s pre-existing telemedicine infrastructure, built from 2017, was positioned to capture. The lesson for platform businesses in regulated, trust-sensitive categories like healthcare is that infrastructure investment made during a low-growth period can become the basis for capturing demand during an unanticipated acceleration, provided the company survives the intervening downturn.

Second, the shift in Practo’s reported financial profile from FY22 to FY24 losses narrowing from Rs 236.5 crore to Rs 17 crore (EBITDA) while revenue grew modestly indicates a strategic pivot toward unit economics and operating discipline rather than continued growth-at-any-cost expansion, consistent with the broader recalibration seen across Indian startups following the 2022 funding slowdown. The 2023 layoff of 41 employees, concentrated in engineering, is consistent with this cost-rationalization reading, though no verified public information is available on the precise rationale communicated internally for that specific action beyond media reporting.

Third, Practo’s pursuit of ABDM and planned UHI compliance for its Ray software represents a strategic bet that future differentiation in Indian digital health will come less from consumer-facing app features and more from interoperability with public health infrastructure positioning the company’s original B2B product, rather than its consumer app, as the more durable long-term asset. Whether this bet proves correct, and how it compares to the strategies of better-capitalized, conglomerate-backed competitors such as Tata 1mg, is not yet resolved in the public record as of the most recent verified disclosures reviewed here.


Discussion Questions

  1. Practo built telemedicine infrastructure from 2017, three years before the pandemic created mass demand for it. What does this sequence suggest about how platform businesses in regulated industries should time infrastructure investment relative to uncertain future demand, and what risks does that timing strategy carry if the anticipated shock never materializes?

  2. Practo’s reported data shows that 67% of e-consultations during the 2020 lockdown led to an in-person visit. How should this finding reshape a healthtech company’s definition of “success” for a telemedicine product — as a substitute for physical care, or as a conversion and referral mechanism into it — and what are the business model implications of each framing?

  3. Comparing Practo’s FY24 revenue (Rs 240 crore) and reported profitability claims against Tata 1mg’s FY25 consolidated revenue (Rs 2,392 crore) and losses (Rs 276 crore), what does the scale gap suggest about the trade-offs between a focused software-and-platform model versus a logistics-heavy, conglomerate-backed pharmacy-and-diagnostics model in Indian digital health?

  4. Practo’s decision to pursue ABDM and UHI compliance for its B2B practice-management software (Ray) suggests a strategic bet on public digital infrastructure as a differentiator. What are the risks and opportunities of tying a private platform’s competitive advantage to a government-run interoperability framework, and how might this affect switching costs for the doctors and clinics using Ray?

  5. Practo’s valuation reportedly fell from $660 million in 2016 to roughly $335 million by 2020, before the company later reported improving unit economics through FY24. What governance and strategic lessons can be drawn about managing investor expectations and capital efficiency when a startup’s growth trajectory is non-linear and subject to external shocks like a pandemic?

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