UpGrad’s University Partnership Model: Building a Degree Business on Borrowed Accreditation
Industry & Competitive Context
Online degrees are a young category in India. The UGC permitted programmes delivered entirely online only in 2018, and its 2020 Open and Distance Learning and Online Programmes Regulations then unified the rules for both formats. The regulatory structure matters strategically. Only eligible universities can offer these degrees, so the platform does not own the credential.
The commercial opportunity was sizable. A RedSeer and Omidyar report projected online higher education sales of USD 1 billion in 2022, up from USD 329 million in 2019, within a post-K12 market expected to reach USD 1.7 billion. These are projections, and I did not verify realised figures.
The competitive set was also defined by regulation. Great Learning, which Byju’s acquired for USD 600 million in July 2021, was named alongside upGrad as a platform partnering with Indian institutions. In this category, competitive advantage depends on which universities a platform can access and keep, and on how well it manages the regulatory risk that comes with them.
Brand Situation Prior to the Partnership Push
upGrad began in 2015 and describes itself as an integrated skilling and lifelong-learning company. Its earliest documented move into Indian degrees came during the COVID-19 period. upGrad launched online degree programmes with OP Jindal Global University and Jamia Hamdard, both government-recognised Institutes of Eminence, and co-founder Mayank Kumar said it aimed to partner with nearly ten more universities.
By March 2022 the company’s own description of scale was much larger. It cited over two million learners across 100+ countries and over 300 university partners, and called itself the most integrated Higher EdTech company in the world. That figure is the company’s self-description, and the release does not say how many of those partners offer UGC-regulated Indian degrees.
Strategic Objective
What is documented is the company-level direction. Chairperson Ronnie Screwvala said in August 2026 that the goal is to serve learners across their entire lifecycle, with growth both organic and through acquisitions including Internshala and Unacademy. In October 2025 he also said the company was on track for a 30% CAGR over the next two to three years.
My interpretation, which is analysis and not disclosed fact, is that university partnerships function as the credibility layer within that lifecycle strategy. Degrees sit at the top of the career-stage ladder, and the company’s boilerplate describes support “from first job to boardroom.”
Campaign Architecture & Execution
The documented model has four layers.
Layer one: a division of labour. upGrad’s official description is explicit. It offers skilling programmes and certifications under its own B2C portfolio and facilitates Indian and global universities to offer diplomas, master’s degrees and executive doctorates, with all degrees awarded solely by the respective universities. The company also describes its capabilities. It says its Global Learning Engine rests on four pillars, including original owned content and IP, a proprietary technology platform, and human-led delivery through coaches and mentors. The university supplies accreditation, and the platform supplies the learning experience around it.
Layer two: domestic and international partners. In January 2022 press coverage identified NMIMS Global and Jindal Global University as upGrad’s Indian MBA and PGDM partners. The company also works with overseas universities. A 2026 comparison article names Liverpool John Moores University as a flagship MBA partner, though that source is a secondary education-loan comparison, not an official one. A company profile I reviewed names IIIT Bangalore, IIM Kozhikode and Northeastern University as partners, but I could not verify that listing against an official source, so it is not relied on.
Layer three: an owned-university option. In January 2022 upGrad committed US$20 million in a first phase to build ATLAS SkillTech University, described as not-for-profit. The university launched on 15 August 2021 as Maharashtra’s first SkillTech university. My analysis is that this reduces dependence on third-party accreditation. The company has not publicly said this was its rationale.
Layer four: regulatory engagement. In January 2022 upGrad announced, in a press note, the appointment of a former Harvard South Asia Institute country director to lead corporate affairs and public policy in India.
The regulatory shocks the model absorbed. This sequence is where the model was stress-tested.
In January 2022 the UGC and AICTE issued public notices stating that higher education institutions may not offer ODL or online programmes through franchise arrangements with edtech firms. The notices did not name upGrad in the passages I reviewed, but the press coverage said they would directly affect it.
In February 2022 the AICTE issued show-cause notices to two private universities over degree courses run with edtech companies. Its chairman said universities could use edtech platforms for classes or online exams but could not go beyond that or enter franchise agreements.
In March 2022 draft amendments to the UGC regulations proposed allowing institutions to source up to 40% of content externally, with edtech firms termed “technology service providers” and barred from advertising the content they helped develop.
In December 2023 the UGC cautioned against edtech companies offering online programmes in association with foreign institutions not recognised by it, calling such franchise arrangements impermissible. Again, the notice as reported does not name upGrad.
Positioning & Consumer Insight
The documented positioning centres on credential legitimacy. In 2021 upGrad unveiled a campaign promoting online degrees, saying it partnered with leading universities to offer UGC-entitled and WES-recognised degree courses that give young Indians a full university experience online. Campaign India credited the film to The Womb and dated the coverage 3 August 2021. The same coverage noted that online education had long been seen as inferior to on-campus study, and that the new undergraduate offering would let students access quality education in their own hometowns.
Two points follow from this. First, the campaign’s own language names regulatory and recognition credentials as the proof points, which suggests the barrier it was addressing was trust in the credential and not only access. That is my reading of the campaign’s wording, not a disclosed research finding.
Second, the company’s boilerplate wording is consistent on one point. The August 2026 release again states that all degrees are awarded solely by the respective universities. The October 2025 release said upGrad “facilitates” universities, while the 2026 text says it “partners with” them. This is a documented wording difference, and I draw no conclusion about intent. It does show how carefully the company words its role relative to the degree-awarding institution.
Media & Channel Strategy
Verified information here is thin. The only partnership-specific creative documented is the 2021 online-degrees film described above. The UGC’s 2022 notice criticised edtech advertising of degrees in newspapers, social media and television in general terms, and the passages reviewed do not attribute this to upGrad. The FY26 release states that marketing and technology costs fell year on year while revenue grew.
Business & Brand Outcomes
All results below are company-level. upGrad does not publicly break out revenue, enrolments or margins for university-partnered degrees.
FY25. The company reported gross revenue of INR 1,943 crore, which closed at total income of INR 1,650 crore after Ind-AS accounting, with INR 556 crore collected but not yet recognised. It reported an Ind-AS EBITDA profit of INR 15 crore against an EBITDA loss of INR 285 crore in FY24, and a net loss of INR 274 crore against INR 560 crore the prior year. Consumer-segment enrolments grew 19%, and international markets contributed 20 to 25% of revenue. That international share is not split between university-partnered and other programmes. Other outlets cite different revenue figures, including operating revenue of ₹1,569 crore, because they report on different accounting bases, so the company’s own release is used here.
FY26. upGrad reported gross revenue of USD 219.5 million including taxes, up 7%, with Ind-AS EBITDA up more than eightfold to USD 13 million and net loss narrowed 52% to USD 13.8 million. Inc42 reported the same results as INR 2,070 crore gross revenue and a loss of INR 130 crore. The company said it has more than 100,000 concurrent learners across its online skilling and degree, study abroad and offline skilling programmes. The Fortune-hosted release is labelled paid content and was distributed through a newswire, so treat it as company-reported.
Strategic Implications
Platform strategy under borrowed credentials. upGrad’s model places the most valuable asset, the degree, with another party. The regulatory sequence from 2022 to 2023 shows the structural risk of this arrangement. The company’s boilerplate answer is to stress that universities award the degrees, and the sources reviewed show regulators drawing the line at who is responsible for the programme, not at the existence of a platform.
Hedging the dependency. Three documented moves reduce exposure to any single regulatory outcome. These are a mix of Indian and global partners, the owned ATLAS university, and the policy-affairs appointment. Whether these were designed as a hedge is my interpretation. A journalist quoted by KrASIA made a related observation, that edtech firms were likely to keep operating because they also offer foreign-university degrees and upskilling certificates. Later regulation on foreign partnerships, as documented above, narrowed that route too.
Profitability versus partnership intensity. The FY25 and FY26 results show improving profitability, but company disclosures do not show how much of it comes from degrees. The company links the improvement to cost management and AI adoption.
The next phase. The chairperson’s stated focus on acquisitions suggests that partnerships are now one component of a broader portfolio and not the sole growth engine. That is an interpretation of his stated priorities.
Discussion Questions
When a company’s core product is a credential that a regulated partner legally owns, where does durable competitive advantage lie: in the platform, the content, the partner network, or the learner relationship? Use the evidence above to defend your answer.
upGrad’s boilerplate emphasises that universities alone award degrees. How might this positioning help with regulators and consumers, and what does it cost in terms of brand ownership?
Evaluate ATLAS SkillTech University as a strategic response to partnership risk. What would you need to know, which is not publicly available, to judge whether it was the right investment?
The 2022 UGC and AICTE notices and the 2023 foreign-institution notice treated franchise-type arrangements differently from technology-service arrangements. How should an edtech firm structure partnerships so that it sits clearly on the compliant side of that line?
upGrad does not disclose revenue or margin for partnered degrees. As an investor or a prospective partner university, how would you assess the economics of the model, and what disclosures would you demand?
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