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Why Marketing and Product Teams Need to Work Together

7 hours ago
4 min read

Industry & Competitive Context

By the early 2010s, the U.S. department store sector was under sustained pressure from discount retailers, off-price chains, and the rapid growth of e-commerce. Consumers accustomed to markdowns, loyalty coupons, and seasonal sales had developed strong promotional shopping habits. Within this environment, J.C. Penney Company, Inc. (NYSE: JCP), a century-old American department store chain, was competing against rivals such as Macy’s, Kohl’s, and Target, all of which relied heavily on frequent discounting and promotional marketing to drive store traffic.

In November 2011, J.C. Penney’s board appointed Ron Johnson, who had previously led Apple’s retail division and played a central role in Target’s design-focused merchandising strategy, as the company’s new Chief Executive Officer. Johnson was recruited specifically to reposition J.C. Penney as a more modern, design-forward retailer.


Infographic titled Why Marketing & Product Teams Need to Work Together, showing two teams, a unified gear graphic, and benefits.

Brand Situation Prior to Campaign

Prior to Johnson’s arrival, J.C. Penney’s business model depended heavily on an extensive promotional calendar, built around frequent sales events, discount coupons, and clearance pricing. According to the company’s own public statements at the time, a large share of its merchandise was sold at a discount rather than at full list price. This promotional structure was deeply embedded not only in the company’s marketing communications but also in its merchandising, inventory planning, supply chain, and store operations.


Strategic Objective

Johnson’s publicly stated objective, announced at a January 2012 investor and media event, was to transform J.C. Penney into a cleaner, simpler, and more design-driven retail brand. The centerpiece of this transformation was a new pricing philosophy, branded “Fair and Square,” which replaced the traditional high-low promotional pricing model with an “everyday low pricing” approach. The company announced it would largely eliminate traditional coupons and most clearance sales events, instead offering three simplified price tiers communicated through revised in-store signage and marketing.


Campaign Architecture & Execution

The “Fair and Square” strategy was launched company-wide in February 2012. It included a new pricing structure, a redesigned private-label and store-brand merchandise mix, a plan to convert stores into a collection of smaller branded “shops” within each J.C. Penney location, and a new corporate logo and marketing identity. The marketing function rolled out new advertising campaigns, in-store signage, and brand messaging built around the “Fair and Square” positioning, communicating the shift away from coupons and sales events toward consistently lower “everyday” prices.

However, as publicly reported at the time and in subsequent business press coverage, this repositioning was executed largely as a top-down pricing and branding decision, announced and rolled out nationally without the extensive market testing that large-scale pricing changes typically undergo at major retailers. The marketing campaign communicating the new pricing strategy proceeded in parallel with merchandising and operational changes, rather than being informed by iterative testing of how customers actually responded to the new pricing structure and in-store experience.


Positioning & Consumer Insight

The “Fair and Square” positioning was built on the premise that customers disliked the complexity and perceived manipulation of traditional promotional pricing, and would instead respond positively to consistently lower prices without the need to search for coupons or wait for sales. This consumer insight was presented publicly by Johnson as a reason customers would prefer simplified pricing.

In practice, as reported by multiple business publications covering the company’s results through 2012, J.C. Penney’s existing customer base had been conditioned over years to associate value with the ritual of finding a bargain, through coupons, sales events, and perceived discounts off a reference price. The removal of these promotional cues, which had previously been reinforced by both marketing campaigns and in-store merchandising, removed a signal that this customer segment had relied on to perceive value, even in cases where the new “everyday” price was comparable to or lower than the prior discounted price.


Media & Channel Strategy

Publicly available information indicates that J.C. Penney communicated the “Fair and Square” repositioning through national television and print advertising, in-store signage redesign, and a new corporate marketing identity, including a revised logo. The company’s public investor communications and press releases from this period confirm that marketing spend was directed toward building awareness of the new pricing philosophy and store format changes.


Business & Brand Outcomes

The financial outcomes of this period are documented in J.C. Penney’s own public filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and were widely reported by business media. In fiscal year 2012, J.C. Penney reported a significant decline in net sales and comparable store sales compared with the prior fiscal year, along with a substantial net loss for the year. The company’s stock price declined significantly over the course of 2012. In April 2013, J.C. Penney’s board of directors removed Ron Johnson as CEO, after roughly seventeen months in the role, and reinstated Mike Ullman, his predecessor, as interim CEO. Following Johnson’s departure, the company publicly announced it would reverse elements of the “Fair and Square” strategy, reintroducing coupons, sales events, and more traditional promotional pricing.


Strategic Implications

The publicly documented record of this case illustrates a structural failure of cross-functional alignment between the marketing function, which was tasked with communicating and building awareness for the new positioning, and the product, merchandising, and pricing functions, which controlled the actual customer-facing economics and in-store experience. The marketing campaign for “Fair and Square” was built around a consumer insight and positioning promise, but the underlying pricing and merchandising changes it promoted were introduced nationally without the kind of pilot testing that would have revealed, before a full rollout, how the existing customer base would respond to the removal of familiar promotional cues.

This case, as covered extensively in business press and referenced in academic case discussions of retail strategy, is commonly cited as an example of what can occur when a major brand repositioning is driven primarily through marketing and executive messaging, while the product and merchandising functions that shape the actual customer experience are changed on the same timeline without integrated testing and feedback loops between the two functions. The result, as reflected in the company’s own reported financial results and subsequent reversal of the strategy, was a significant and rapid loss of sales and customer trust, followed by a public retreat from the new positioning within roughly a year of its launch.


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